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Compensation and Weights for
Trade-offs in Engineering Design:
Beyond the Weighted Sum
Multicriteria decision support methods are common in engineering design. These meth-
ods typically rely on a summation of weighted attributes to accomplish trade-offs among
competing objectives. It has long been known that a weighted sum, when used for mul-
ticriteria optimization, may fail to locate all points on a nonconvex Pareto frontier. More
recent results from the optimization literature relate the curvature of an objective function
to its ability to capture Pareto points, but do not consider the significance of the objective
function parameters in choosing one Pareto point over another. A parametrized family of
aggregations appropriate for engineering design is shown to model decisions capturing
all possible trade-offs, and therefore can direct the solution to any Pareto optimum. This
paper gives a mathematical and theoretical interpretation of the parameters of this family
of aggregations as defining a degree of compensation among criteria as well as a mea-
sure of their relative importance. The inability to reach all Pareto optima is shown to be
surmounted by this consideration of degree of compensation as an additional parameter
of the decision. Additionally, the direct specification of importance weights is common to
many decision methods. The choice of a single point from a Pareto frontier by specifying
importance weights alone is shown to depend on the degree of compensation implicit in
the aggregation. Thus both the degree of compensation and weights must be considered
to capture all potentially acceptable decisions. A simple truss design example is used here
to illustrate the concepts. DOI: 10.1115/1.1909204
Keywords: Multicriteria Analysis, Engineering Design, Design Decision Making, Aggre-
gation Functions, Functional Equations, Compensation, Importance Weights,
Indifference, Utility1 Introduction
Multicriteria decision making is an important part of engineer-
ing design. There are many methods, both informal and formal,
that support such design decision making, including quality func-
tion deployment QFD 1, and the analytic hierarchy process
AHP 2. These design decision methods share several key fea-
tures. All rely on the aggregation of multiple criteria or measures
of performance to choose among designs, and most methods allow
for the assignment of importance to individual attributes through
the use of weights. These importance weights are intended to al-
low for meaningful comparison of many options when two or
more attributes must be traded off against each other. Among de-
cision methods, weighted-sum aggregation of preferences is by far
the most common, as is direct specification of importance
weights.
Although the problems of the weighted-sum formulation for
optimization have been discussed previously 3–8, that discus-
sion has been centered on the optimization task of recovering an
entire Pareto frontier by adjusting parameters of the objective
function, not on the decision task of selecting parameters to
achieve a desired outcome. This paper gives an interpretation of
the decision parameters as governing both the relative importance
of the attributes and the degree of compensation between them.
Compensation refers to a willingness to allow high performance
on one attribute to compensate for low performance on another
and is a property of a decision rather than a design. Mirroring
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relies exclusively on importance weights to define a decision runs
the risk of missing “optimal” options. A complete model of a
two-attribute decision requires an additional parameter to specify
the degree of compensation between criteria 9. The ability to
adjust the degree of compensation to capture all Pareto points is
related to prior results concerning the ability to adjust the curva-
ture of an objective function 6. However, since the decision goal
is not to capture all Pareto points, but to select desired points, it is
also shown here that even when all Pareto points can be selected,
the choice of one point from a Pareto set is influenced not only by
the importance weights, but also by the degree of compensation.
Thus the direct specification of importance weights can only be an
ad hoc process, producing answers that are often inappropriate.
Several relevant results are presented here:
• The degree of compensation between criteria is a crucial
parameter that defines engineering design decisions. In
some cases, the good performance of one attribute can com-
pensate, to some degree, for the poor performance of other
attributes. Both the degree of compensation and the relative
importance weighting among criteria must be specified to
define a decision.
• For decision making that conforms to the axioms of rational
design 10,11, a parametrized family of functions, with
compensation parameter s, was previously shown to span a
complete range of degrees of compensation 12.
• The compensation parameter s increases with the degree of
compensation. This is interpreted mathematically in two dif-
ferent ways, most importantly by showing that higher de-
grees of compensation favor designs with high performance
on one attribute and low performance on another over de-
signs with solid but unexceptional performance on both at-
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tributes. The compensation parameter must be taken to-
gether with the importance weights to define a decision. The
degree of compensation between attributes, along with the
relative importance weights, is a trade-off strategy.
• The use of a weighted sum preselects a single degree of
compensation between attributes in which the parameter s
=1. It is thus incapable of modeling all possible trade-off
strategies.
• When employing this parametrized family of functions, a
ratio of weights and a degree of compensation to select any
Pareto optimal point can always be found.
• The ability to choose any Pareto point is not present when
the degree of compensation is preselected, as, for example,
with the use of a weighted sum.
2 Motivating Example: A Simple Truss Structure
Consider the structure shown in Fig. 1. This is a pin-jointed
two-member bracket to support a load of 1 kg P=1 kg at a
distance of 1 m from a wall L=1. The positions of the wall
mounts are fixed, with the lower support 0.5 m below the upper
support y=0.5. Both members are made of aluminum 6061-
T6. The designer controls four design variables
x 0.1 m,0.9 m distance from wall to pin
t 5 mm,20 mm thickness of bending member
h 5 mm,20 mm height of bending member
w 5 mm,20 mm width of square compression member
For this example, the performance measures to consider are the
mass M of the structure and the safety factor S. Both quantities
can be expressed analytically, but in this example the performance
calculation will be treated as a black box. The details of the cal-
culations are presented below. The design problem is to minimize
the mass of the structure while maximizing the factor of safety.
Furthermore, suppose that no additional advantage is gained
from factors of safety above 10. Also, designs with safety factors
below 1 should not be considered. Using optimization or other
means, it can be determined that the minimum mass achievable
with a factor of safety of 1 is 123 g, while the minimum mass
achievable with a factor of safety of 10 is 302 g. The best designs
will be trade-offs between the safety factor and the mass.
Assuming that both 123 g the lowest possible mass for the
acceptable range of safety factors and 302 g the mass corre-
sponding to the highest safety factor are acceptable, it is common
to normalize the performance measures. Here we follow the ap-
proach of the method of imprecision MoI 9,13 and normalize
Fig. 1 Example of a simple truss structureby specifying preferences. The results would not be substantially
1046 / Vol. 127, NOVEMBER 2005different for other normalization schemes; indeed, normalization
is not necessary. Let the preferences for mass and safety be as
follows:
massM =
302 − M
179
1
safetyS =
S − 1
9
2
so that mass123=1, mass302=0, safety1=0, and
safety10=1, as shown in Fig. 2. Note that these simple linear
preferences are chosen for convenience; all the results presented
here hold for more complicated preferences as well.
One way to select a best design is to assign importance weights
to the two criteria and then to use a weighted sum to aggregate
preferences; the best designs will have the highest overall prefer-
ence. Let the importance weights assigned to mass 1 and safety
2 be normalized so that their sum is 1. Employing this ap-
proach, there are only three possible “best” points, summarized in
Table 1. According to this weighted-sum aggregation, all other
possible points are worse when both mass and safety factor are
Fig. 2 Preferences for mass and safety factorconsidered. These points are shown on the graph in Fig. 3.
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The three “best” points shown in Fig. 3 do not represent the
entire range of reasonable trade-offs between the two performance
measures, mass and safety. To make the notion of a “reasonable”
decision more precise, we use the idea of Pareto optimality 14:
Definition 1. The alternative A dominates the alternative B if A
performs no worse than B on all attributes, and better than B on
at least one attribute. In this case, regardless of the weights or the
degree of compensation, it is always better to choose A over B. A
feasible solution is undominated (or Pareto optimal) if there is no
other feasible solution that dominates it.
Figure 4 shows a plot of all the feasible Pareto optimal points,
normalized with respect to preference, with the three points from
Fig. 3 retained. The calculation of the Pareto frontier is detailed
Table 1 Three “best” possible
1
Mass
g
Safety
factor
10.658 123 1
0.49210.658 129 1.6
10.492 302 10
Fig. 3 Three “best” points found using weighted-sum
explorationFig. 4 Pareto frontier with three “best” points
Journal of Mechanical Designin Sec. 6. Examining the entire Pareto frontier, we see that it is
made up of two concave sections. The weighted-sum approach
fails to identify any Pareto points on the concave sections of the
frontier, though it is quite possible that one of those points repre-
sents the most desirable compromise.
This inability of the weighted sum to generate an entire con-
cave Pareto frontier has long been known in an optimization
context. Koski 3 called this deficiency “well known” and argued
that such concave Pareto frontiers are common in structural opti-
mization. Messac 4 presented the physical programing paradigm
as an alternative to weighted-sum methods, and Chen et al. 15
advocated a Tchebycheff norm to capture all Pareto points. Athan
and Papalambros 5 showed that a weighted compromise pro-
graming function could capture an entire Pareto frontier, given a
suitable choice of exponents. Messac et al. 6,7 and Messac and
Ismail-Yahaya 8 considered general requirements on the curva-
ture of an objective function to enable the capture of all Pareto
points. Research continues on efficient methods to capture Pareto
frontiers 16. These researchers all address the problem of defin-
ing an objective function that may be used to locate all points on
a Pareto frontier. In that optimization-oriented framework, the
Pareto frontier is first uncovered and then the most desirable of
the Pareto points is chosen. The research presented in this paper
takes a different point of view, in which the parameters of a de-
cision function are selected to pinpoint the most desirable option
without the intermediate step of uncovering an entire Pareto fron-
tier. The parameters that define the decision also determine which
Pareto points are accessible. It is shown here that a known family
of preference aggregation operators for design are a priori capable
of accessing all Pareto points, when many other methods are not.
It also gives an interpretation of the meaning of the parameters of
the operator, a matter that is not addressed in the optimization
literature except insofar as these parameters affect the ability of
the function to capture Pareto points.
Weighted-sum formulations remain quite common in engineer-
ing design applications 17–20. Recent research also includes
alternative approaches to multicriteria optimization: Wassenaar
and Chen 21 and Wassenaar et al. 22 advocate using the single
criterion of consumer demand; Wan and Krishnamurty 23 use an
iterative interactive procedure to avoid inconsistencies in the
specification of utility functions, an approach that could be
coupled with the techniques presented here; and Tappeta and
Renaud 24 also focus on iterative discovery of preferences, in
this case through repeated approximation of the local Pareto fron-
tier. Farhang-Mehr and Azarm 25 discuss quality metrics to as-
sess the “goodness” of Pareto points found by evolutionary algo-
rithms, and Maddulapalli et al. discuss gradient methods 26.
Olewnik et al. 27 examine the relevance of Pareto optimality to
so-called flexible systems. Wood and Agogino 28 propose a nor-
mative method for conceptual design that combines a heteroge-
neous design space model with expected value decision-making
and information value theory. Franssen and Bucciarelli 29 argue
that rationality in group decision making can be defined in game-
theoretic terms considering the utilities of multiple decision
makers.
Clearly, a weighted-sum approach to multicriteria decision
making is problematic if it cannot identify all possible best solu-
tions. In the example presented here, the performance calculations
nts found with a weighted sum
x t h w
0.71 5 5 5
0.82 5 5 5
0.9 5 9.34 8.16poiare all analytic expressions, which are easily evaluated, and the
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Pareto frontier is thus easily discovered. In such simple cases, a
designer can choose to informally explore regions of the perfor-
mance space that the formal decision model does not identify.
When the design is more complicated, perhaps because evaluation
is more costly say, each point is a finite element calculation rather
than an analytic expression or because there are more than two
competing objectives, informal exploration becomes much more
difficult and designers may rely more on automated techniques,
such as optimization. In these more complicated design situations,
it is particularly important that design decision methods provide
reliable guidance.
In the example presented above, it is clear that the choice of a
point on the Pareto frontier depends on the trade-off between
safety and mass. The example shows that a weighted-sum aggre-
gation cannot model all possible trade-offs, and may miss large
desirable regions of a performance space. It will be shown later
that the difficulty highlighted by this example is not peculiar to a
weighted sum. Intuitively it might seem possible to continously
navigate a Pareto frontier from one end to the other by continu-
ously varying the importance weights for two attributes. In fact,
as is suggested by the problems exhibited here by the weighted
sum, a formal model of a design decision requires, in addition,
independent control over the degree of compensation among cri-
teria. The full Pareto frontier cannot be identified by simply
choosing importance weights alone, and even when it can be so
identified, the choice of one point from that frontier depends on
the degree of compensation as well as the importance weights.
3 Aggregation Operators for Engineering Design
All support methods for multicriteria decision making ulti-
mately rely on the aggregation of disparate preferences with ag-
gregation functions. In the MoI, for instance, customers and de-
signers assign preference values between 0 absolutely
unacceptable and 1 most preferred to various attributes. Math-
ematically, preferences are maps or functions from a set of design
or performance variables to the closed unit interval 0, 1. Prefer-
ence functions are denoted , while the Greek letters  ,,…, will
be used to indicate the values in 0, 1 that preferences may as-
sume. The functions mass and safety in the example presented
above are both preferences.
When making a decision based on preferences for two or more
attributes, it is necessary to combine the separate preferences into
a single preference map. A rigorous treatment of aggregation re-
quires some mathematics concerning the distinction between ag-
gregation operators and aggregation functions; these details are
presented in the Appendix. For most purposes, an aggregation is a
function P, which takes two or more preference values 1 , 2,
etc, together with their importance weights, which are denoted i
and treated as parameters, and returns a single preference value
aggx = P1, ¯ ,n;1, ¯ ,n 3
where ix=i for i ranging over the n attributes. In the example
presented above, 1 was the preference for mass, 2 was the pref-
erence for safety, and the aggregation P was a weighted sum
P1,2;1,2 =
11 + 22
1 + 2
4
The aggregation of preference is defined for an arbitrary finite
number of individual preference functions. The following discus-
sion and results consider the case of aggregation of exactly two
individual preferences. Aggregation of more than two preferences
is accomplished using a pairwise hierarchy 30. A structural au-
tomotive design example with hierarchical preferences was pre-
sented by Scott and Antonsson 31 using a reduced set of aggre-
gation operators; that example was exercised with the full family
of aggregation operators in Chapter 8 of Scott 9. A more detailed
discussion of the issues surrounding pairwise hierarchical aggre-
gation is outside the scope of this paper and is planned for future
1048 / Vol. 127, NOVEMBER 2005publications. Note that in pairwise hierarchical aggregation, both
importance weights and degree of compensation may be different
for each pairwise comparison.
From a purely formal point of view, any operator could be used.
Not all operators, however, are appropriate for decision making in
engineering design. The class of possible operators can be re-
stricted initially by supposing an intuitively reasonable set of axi-
oms for engineering design preference aggregation. The axioms
shown in Table 2 have been presented and discussed in detail
previously 32, and aggregation functions, which fulfill these axi-
oms, will be called design appropriate. Here we point out only
axiom AF.4, idempotency, and axiom AF.5, annihilation, which
distinguish the MoI from other decision methods. Multiattribute
utility theory 33 is an alternative axiomatic approach to decision
making and has been compared previously in some detail to the
preference-aggregation approach presented here 9,34,35.
Scott and Antonsson 12 showed that the operators that satisfy
the axioms in Table 2 are a restricted set of weighted means and
that, in particular, there is a family of aggregation operators Ps
that spans an entire range of possible operators between min and
max, given by
Ps1,2;1,2 = 11s + 22s
1 + 2
1/s 5
It is readily shown 12 that
P
− = lim
s→−
Ps = min 6
P0 = lim
s→0
Ps = 11221/1+2 7
P1 = lim
s→1
Ps =
11 + 22
1 + 2
8
P = lim
s→+
Ps = max 9
Note that P0 is the geometric mean, and P1 is the arithmetic mean
or weighted sum. As noted above, both the degree of compensa-
tion s and the ratio of importance weights may vary between
comparison pairs in a hierarchical aggregation of more than two
attributes. The implications and uses of this family of operators
will be discussed below.
4 Compensation Strategies: How to Consider All
Designs
In Sec. 2 it was seen that a weighted sum cannot always iden-
Table 2 Axioms of the MoI for aggregation functions
AF.1 Monotonicity
P1 ,2 ;1 ,2P1 ,2 ;1 ,2∀ 22
P1 ,2 ;1 ,2P1 ,2 ;1 ,2∀ 22 ;12
AF.2 Symmetry
P1 ,2 ;1 ,2=P2 ,1 ;2 ,1
AF.3 Continuity
P1 ,2 ;1 ,2=lim2→2P1 ,2 ;1 ,2P1 ,2 ;1 ,2=lim2→2P1 ,2 ;1 ,2AF.4 Idempotency
P , ;1 ,2= ∀ 1+20
AF.5 Annihilation
P ,0 ;1 ,2=0 ∀ 20
AF.6 Self-scaling weights
P1 ,2 ;1t ,2t=P1 ,2 ;1 ,2∀ 1+2 , t0
AF.7 Zero weights
P1 ,2 ;1 ,0=1∀ 10tify all Pareto points for a design. This is just one instance of a
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more general result about preference aggregation functions: in
fact, no fixed degree of compensation e.g., a weighted sum can
always identify all Pareto points.
It was noted by Otto and Antonsson 11 that, in addition to
importance weights, the degree of compensation among goals is a
variable feature of multiattribute decision problems. In particular,
decisions were classified as either compensating or noncompen-
sating. A noncompensating solution was said to hold when the
most desirable solution was the one that maximizes the perfor-
mance of the lowest-performing attribute; this case was modeled
mathematically by the minimum operator
aggx = min1,2 10
where 1x=1, 2x=2. In compensating decisions, higher
performance on one attribute could partially make up for lower
performance on another attribute; this situation was modeled us-
ing a weighted product of powers also called the weighted geo-
metric mean:
aggx = 1
12
21/1+2 11
The family of aggregation operators Ps presented by Scott and
Antonsson 12 makes clear that compensation is not an either/or
proposition, and indeed that there is a continuous spectrum of
compensation degrees between min at P
− and max at P+. As
with importance weights, there is an intuitive notion that by con-
tinuously varying the degree of compensation, it should be pos-
sible to navigate a Pareto frontier; the exact significance of the
“compensation parameter” s, however, is not immediately obvi-
ous. The meaning of the parameter s as a measure of degree of
compensation can be made more precise in two ways. First, the
overall preference for any particular alternative increases with s:
Proposition 2. Ps1 ,2 ;1 ,2 is nondecreasing as a func-
tion of s
d
ds
Ps1,2;1,2	 0 12
All proofs are presented in the Appendix. Dyckhoff and Pedrycz
36 prove a result similar to Proposition 2.
To relate Proposition 2 to the example presented above, con-
sider the three “optimal” points shown in Fig. 3. Using the
weighted sum s=1 and equal importance weights 1=2, the
overall preferences for these three points are as shown in the
penultimate column in Table 3. Proposition 2 states that if a larger
value of s is used, then the overall preference for all points will be
larger. For instance, setting s=2 generates the final column of
Table 3. If a value of s1 were used, overall preference would
decrease for all points.
The data in Table 3 show that the absolute overall preference
for a particular point is not a meaningful measure of the degree of
compensation. In comparing alternatives, it is the order of the
relative preferences, not the absolute value of those preferences,
that matters. Note that solution B was considered best of the three
for s=1, but that both A and C were found to be superior to B
when s=2.
The second measure of degree of compensation indicates which
sorts of designs relatively compensating or noncompensating are
favored by the aggregation. Consider any two alternatives A and
B, with preferences A= 1 ,2, B= 1 ,2, and with 1
Table 3 Overall preferences for three points with s=1 and s
=2
point 1 2 P11 ,2 ;1 ,2 P21 ,2 ;1 ,2
A min mass 1 0 0.5 0.71
B “compromise” 0.97 0.07 0.52 0.69
C max safety 0 1 0.5 0.711 ,22. The alternatives A and B in the tables above, for
Journal of Mechanical Designinstance, fulfill this condition. In this case, the least compensating
function, the mins=−, dictates a choice of B over A regardless
of weights, provided they are nonzero. The most compensating
function, the maxs= +, dictates that A is preferred to B. Propo-
sition 2 states only that the overall preference for A and the overall
preference for B both increase as the parameter s increases. The
second interpretation of the degree of compensation shows that
the relative preference for A the option selected by the most
compensating function over B the option selected by the least
compensating function increases with the compensation param-
eter. This measure shows that increasing s tends to favor 1 ,2
over 1 ,2, in that the ratio Ps /Ps is an increasing func-
tion of s.
Proposition 3. If 1 ,2 , 1 ,2 are two preference points,
with 11 ,22, then
d
ds
Ps1,2;1,2
Ps1,2;1,2
	 0 13
as long as 1 ,20.
Proposition 3 states that as the parameter s increases, the rela-
tive preference for A rather than B increases as well. In this case,
there will be a value s* at which the preferences for A and B will
be identical; for ss*, B will be preferred to A, while for ss*,
A will be preferred to B. Thus the parameter s is indeed a measure
of degree of compensation among goals. For the A and B dis-
cussed above, s*=1.239; while the importance weights remain
equal, strategies with s1.239 more compensating than P1.239
select A over B, strategies with s1.239 less compensating than
P1.239 select B over A.
5 Selecting Among Pareto Optimal Points
Two different ways of quantifying trade-offs between prefer-
ences have now been discussed. One is the use of numerical
weights to quantify the relative importance of different attributes;
it was seen that these importance weights alone do not suffice to
capture all reasonable decisions. The second is the assessment of a
compensation parameter s in Eq. 5 to quantify the degree of
compensation between two attributes. In this section, it is shown
that an aggregation of two preferences actually depends on both
these parameters: the compensation parameter s, and the ratio of
the weights 1 and 2 assigned to the two preferences. It follows
from axiom AF.6 that only the ratio of weights is significant. By
appropriately selecting both parameters it is possible to model any
“reasonable” decision. Furthermore, both degree of compensation
and weights must be considered to capture all potentially accept-
able decisions.
The key result about the parameterized family of functions de-
fined in 5 is that, unlike a weighted sum, it can be used to select
any undominated point. If both degree of compensation and
weighting can be considered, then it is possible to model a deci-
sion to choose any Pareto optimal solution. That is, for any indi-
vidual in a set of undominated solutions, there exist a degree of
compensation s and a ratio of weights =2 /1 that select that
individual as the “best” overall solution:
Proposition 4. For any pair 1 ,2 in an undominated finite
set M of preference pairs, there exist s* and *=2* /1* such
that
Ps*1,2;1,* = max
i,jM
Ps*i, j;1,* 14
Proposition 4 says that it is mathematically possible to choose a
ratio of weights and a degree of compensation to select any par-
ticular undominated point, at least from a finite set of possible
solutions. Consider the Pareto frontier calculated for the truss ex-
ample, paying special attention to three points labeled A, B, and C
see Fig. 5 and Table 4.
Recall that point B could not be selected by the standard
weighted-sum approach s=1, for any choice of weights 1 ,2.
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A strategy that uses the degree of compensation s=−1, however,
chooses B over all other Pareto points when the importance
weights are equal. For any other point on the Pareto frontier, there
is some choice of s and  that selects that point above all the
others. A method to simultaneously determine a degree of com-
pensation s and a weight ratio  for a given problem was pre-
sented by Scott and Antonsson 37.
The special case of only two undominated candidates is a case
that can be resolved using only importance weights. Even with a
fixed degree of compensation, by a judicious selection of weights,
it is always possible to select one of two undominated points:
Proposition 5. If 1 ,2 and 1 ,2 are two preference
points, neither of which dominates the other (assume without loss
of generality that 11 and 22), then for every degree of
compensation s − , +, there is a weight  such that
Ps1,2;1, = Ps1,2;1, 15
However, the ability to choose either one of two undominated
points does not imply the ability to choose even any one of three
dominated points. Consider the example of the three alternatives
A, B, and C discussed immediately above. The preferences are
1,2 = 1A,2A = 0.97,0.07 16
1,2 = 1B,2B = 0.47,0.46 17

1,
2 = 1C,2C = 0,1 18
which are mutually undominated. Using a weighted sum with its
fixed degree of compensation s=1, let the weight assigned to the
first preference of the ordered pair be fixed at 1 and let  be the
weight associated with the second preference. Then if 1.28, 
is preferred to . If 0.87, 
 is preferred to . Thus there is no
weighting that can select  over both 
 and ; this undominated
point will never be selected as long as s=1. It was shown above
that this point is easily selected when s=−1. This problem is not
unique to the weighted sum, but is present for all aggregation
Fig. 5 Pareto frontier with selected points A, B, and C
Table 4 Performances and pref
Point Mass Safety 1
A 129 1.6 0.97
B 217 5.15 0.47
C 302 10 01050 / Vol. 127, NOVEMBER 2005methods that dictate a single fixed degree of compensation be-
tween attributes.
Proposition 6. For any fixed degree of compensation s−,
for any preference point 1 ,2 with 01 ,21, there exist
1 ,2 , 
1 ,
2, such that all three points are mutually undomi-
nated but
Ps1,2;1, Ps1,2;1, 19
or
Ps1,2;1, Ps
1,
2;1, 20
for all possible weights .
Of course, it is possible to choose a degree of compensation and
a weight sequentially, rather than simultaneously, and achieve any
undominated point. Any method, however, that restricts aggrega-
tion a priori to a single fixed degree of compensation potentially
excludes some undominated points from consideration.
Similarly, when weights are determined first, some undomi-
nated points may become unattainable by any choice of degree of
compensation. Consider this example: if weights are unrestricted,
then the two preference points = 0.5,0.9 and = 0.6,0.1 do
not dominate each other, and there exist compensation-weight
pairs to select either one over the other. If the weights are declared
equal, then the order of elements is irrelevant and  dominates .
Indeed, whenever the second element has a higher weight than the
first, then  dominates . This situation only arises, however,
when reversing the order of one preference makes one preference
dominate the other. Whenever two points do not dominate each
other, even if the elements of one point are reversed, then for any
weight there is a degree of compensation that will achieve equal-
ity. When reversing the order of elements allows one point to
dominate the other, then there are always some weights that pre-
clude equality for all degrees of compensation.
Proposition 7. If 1 ,2 and 1 ,2 are two preference
points, neither of which dominates the other (assume without loss
of generality that 11 and 22), then the following are
true:
1. If 11, 22, then for all 0 there exists a degree of
compensation s such that Ps1 ,2 ;1 ,=Ps1 ,2 ;1 ,.
2. If 1221, then there exists a weight 0 such
that there is no degree of compensation s such that
Ps1 ,2 ;1 ,=Ps1 ,2 ;1 ,.
In summary, if the degree of compensation s is chosen in ad-
vance and is not the mins=− or the maxs= +, then it is
always possible to choose one point of two undominated points by
appropriate choice of weights. However, it is no longer always
possible to choose any one point from an undominated set. Meth-
ods which rely exclusively on the arithmetic mean, or on any
other fixed degree of compensation, do not truly consider all un-
dominated points as potential solutions. Neither is a choice of a
degree of compensation by itself enough to choose among any set
of undominated points. In order for a decision model to consider
all possible decisions it is necessary and sufficient that both de-
gree of compensation and importance weights be appropriately
established.
nces of three points from Fig. 5
2 P1 1 ,2; 1, 1 P−1 1 ,2; 1, 1
7 0.52 0.13
6 0.47 0.46
0.5 0ere

0.0
0.4
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6 Example
Returning to the example of the bracket shown in Fig. 1, recall
that the bracket is made of aluminum 6061-T6, which has the
following relevant material properties:
Young’s modulus E 69109 Pa
Density  2660 kg/m3
Yield stress  275106 Pa
Recall as well that there are four design variables:
x 0.1 m,0.9 m distance from wall to pin
t 5 mm,20 mm thickness of bending member
h 5 mm,20 mm height of bending member
w 5 mm,20 mm width of square compression member
as well as two fixed parameters:
P=1 kg load supported by structure
L=1 m distance from supported load to wall
The first performance measure is total mass M in kg
M = htL + w2x2 + y2 = 2660ht + w2x2 + 0.25 21
The safety factor S has two components, the safety factor for the
bending member Sb and the safety factor for the compression
member Sc. Since the yield stress in the bending member is , and
the maximum stress in the bending member is 12PL−x / th2, the
factor of safety in bending is the ratio
Sb =
th2
12PL − x
=
th2
1201 − x
22
Similarly, using the Euler buckling load, the safety factor in the
compression member is
Sc =
2Exyw4
12PLx2 + y21.5
=
2Exyw4
120x2 + 0.251.5
23
The safety factor for the entire design is defined to be the mini-
mum of the two
S = min th21201 − x , 
2Exyw4
120x2 + 0.251.5 24
Note that this is a strictly noncompensating aggregation s=−
of the two individual safety factors.
The design problem is to minimize the mass while maximizing
the factor of safety; both are analytic expressions. First, note that
mass is linear in both t and h, whereas the factor of safety in
bending is linear in t but quadratic in h. Thus, as long as no other
design variables reach the maximum acceptable dimensions, it
will always be preferable to increase h rather than t. Setting t
= tmin=5 mm reduces the problem to the three design variables
x , h, and w. Both h and w can be expressed as functions of x and
a safety factor, and thus finding the minimum possible mass for a
given safety factor requires solving a rational equation in x. These
solutions yield a Pareto frontier of designs, which is shown in Fig.
6. Note that in Figs. 6 and 7 the Pareto frontier is plotted in
performance space i.e., safety factor versus mass. In all other
graphs the preferences for the performances are plotted, which is
why the Pareto frontier curve appears backward here. The change
is made for these two figures so the design variable values that
correspond to the best performances may be presented.
The values of x , h, and w, which generate these optimal de-
signs, are included in Fig. 7. It can be seen from Fig. 7 that at each
Pareto point, at least one domain constraint is active: in particular,
for low mass, h takes its minimum acceptable value of 5 mm,
whereas for higher mass, x takes its maximum acceptable value of
0.9 m. Nevertheless, along most of the Pareto frontier two design
variables are changing as the frontier is traversed.
Journal of Mechanical DesignTaking the minimum and maximum values on the Pareto fron-
tier for weight and factor of safety, setting the best and worst
values to preferences of =1 and =0, respectively, the Pareto
frontier can be normalized as shown in Fig. 8; note that this
preference-based display is the format that was used earlier. Fur-
ther note that the utopia point is now the upper right-hand corner
of the graph, since preference for mass decreases with mass. The
three “optimal” points found earlier by the weighted-sum method
are shown as black circles on the graph in Fig. 8.
By allowing both weights and degrees of compensation to vary,
any of the points on the Pareto frontier may be selected as the
highest performing point. For this example, setting s=−1 and
varying the weights allows for a more varied range of “best”
designs see Table 5. These points are shown as squares on the
graph in Fig. 8.
By allowing the weight assigned to one attribute to be much
larger than the weight assigned to the other, points much closer to
the extremes of the Pareto frontier can be reached with s=−1 see
Table 6. These points are shown as triangles on the graph in Fig.
8.
Fig. 6 Pareto frontier of best performancesFig. 7 Pareto frontier with design variable values
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7 Conclusion
Weighted-sum aggregation with importance weights is common
to many methods for engineering design decision making. Three
important difficulties with these methods are the inability of
weighted-sum methods to select all Pareto points, the arbitrary
nature of direct assignment of importance weights, and the fact
that these methods have a fixed degree of compensation among
criteria. Although the inability of weighted-sum methods to re-
cover nonconvex Pareto frontiers is well known in the optimiza-
tion literature, research into parametrized objective functions that
can capture entire Pareto frontiers has not discussed the use of
function parameters to define correct decisions. This paper has
presented an interpretation of the decision parameters of a family
of weighted means that has been developed previously for engi-
neering design decision making.
It is shown here that a complete model of an engineering deci-
sion depends not only on the importance weights, but also on the
degree of compensation. A weighted sum, or any other predeter-
mined aggregation procedure, is overly and inappropriately con-
straining. The appropriate degree of compensation among at-
tributes is situation dependent, and a “one-size-fits-all” decision
method that dictates an aggregation method can lead to incorrect
results. For the two-attribute case, an easily computed family of
Fig. 8 Normalized Pareto frontier
Table 5 Optimal points for s=−1 and 1« †0.1,0.9‡
1 Weight Safety x h w
0.1 2.62 7.5 0.9 8.09 7.59
0.2 2.48 6.7 0.9 7.65 7.38
0.3 2.36 6.1 0.9 7.30 7.21
0.4 2.26 5.6 0.9 6.99 7.06
0.5 2.17 5.15 0.9 6.70 6.91
0.6 2.07 4.7 0.9 6.41 6.76
0.7 1.96 4.2 0.9 6.05 6.57
0.8 1.83 3.65 0.9 5.64 6.34
0.9 1.64 2.95 0.9 5.07 6.01
Table 6 Optimal points for s=−1 and large weight ratios
1 weight safety x h w
0.01 2.88 9.05 0.9 8.89 7.96
0.05 2.72 8.1 0.9 8.41 7.74
0.95 1.55 2.55 0.89 5 5.77
0.99 1.32 1.7 0.83 5 5.101052 / Vol. 127, NOVEMBER 2005preference-aggregation functions is completely determined by two
parameters that represent the trade-off strategy degree of com-
pensation and ratio of importance weights. A number of results
concerning aggregation functions were presented, formalizing the
definition of the term “compensation” and proving that this pa-
rametrized family of aggregation functions, unlike methods that
fix the degree of compensation, is capable of modeling all rational
design decisions.
The correct choice of a level of compensation s and importance
weights i for a particular decision should not be made arbitrarily,
as the arbitrary specification of these values can lead to undesired
results. A systematic method for determining the values of these
parameters using a method of indifference points has been pre-
sented previously 37. The research presented here provides
mathematical and theoretical background underpinning that sys-
tematic method. It was seen that as the value of the compensation
parameter s increases, so does the propensity of the function to
select designs with one high performance and one low perfor-
mance over designs with average performance with respect to
both attributes; this provides an interpretation of the term “com-
pensation” in engineering design. A related result is that the
choice of one member of a Pareto set by specifying importance
weights is sensitive to the degree of compensation, showing that
while a higher importance weight will tend to favor one attribute
over another, there can be no absolute interpretation of the mean-
ing of importance weights in the absence of the degree of com-
pensation. Any method that intends to provide an absolute inter-
pretation of importance weights by fixing the degree of
compensation may miss some Pareto points. Thus the only meth-
ods that are capable of defining sensible decisions without running
the risk of missing desired points are methods that can
model a full range of both importance weights and degrees of
compensation.
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Appendix: Definitions and Proofs
Definition 8. A preference is a map  :X→ 0,1, where X is a
set, usually of design or performance variables.
Definition 9. For a set of preferences i :X→ 0,1, the aggre-
gation of the i is itself a preference agg:X→ 0,1, defined
(pointwise) by a functional aggregation operator P : PFXn
R+n \ 0	→PFX
aggx = P1,…,n;1,…,nx 25
where the parameters iR+ are weights, and PFX is the
space of preference functions on X, the set  
 :X→ 0,1	. An
aggregation operator must satisfy:
P1, ¯ ,n;1, ¯ ,nx1 = P1, ¯ ,n;1, ¯ ,nx2
26
whenever ix1=ix2 for all i.
Following Definition 9, a preference aggregation operator P
takes as its inputs two preference functions 1 and 2, together
with the weighting parameters 1 and 2, and returns an aggre-
gated preference function agg. It is also possible to consider the
map Pˆ : 0,12R+2 \ 0	→ 0,1, which operates directly on pref-
erence values, rather than the aggregation operator P. If 1x
=1 and 2x=2 at some point x, it may be desirable that there
be a Pˆ that allows the calculation of aggregated preference by
composition
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P1,2;1,2x = Pˆ 1x,2x;1,2 = Pˆ 1,2;1,2
27
The requirement 26 that aggregated preferences be consistent for
all x implies that Pˆ is well defined, and indeed that P and Pˆ can
be identified with each other. Call Pˆ the aggregation function
corresponding to the aggregation operator P. When it is clear
from context, the ˆ notation may be dropped and P will represent
the aggregation function.
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume, for computational simplicity,
that 1+2=1. This assumption can be made without loss of gen-
erality by invoking axiom AF.6. Then
Ps1,2;1,2 = 11s + 22s1/s 28
and
d
ds
Ps1,2;1,2 =
1
s
Ps1,2;1,211s
+ 22
s−111
s log 1 + 22
slog 2
−
1
s
log11
s + 22
s 29
In the case that s0, we wish to establish that
11
s + 22
s−111
s log 1 + 22
s log 2 −
1
s
log11
s
+ 22
s 0 30
Multiplying both sides by s11
s+22
s, which is nonpositive,
we now require
s11
s log 1 + 22
s log 2	 11
s + 22
slog11
s
+ 22
s 31
Bringing s inside on the left side of the inequality, we now need to
show
11
s log1
s + 22
s log2
s	 11
s + 22
slog11
s
+ 22
s 32
2 sSince x log x is a concave function for x0, as d /dx x log x
let = 2−2 /2. Then 1,2− dominates 1 ,2. Since M is
Journal of Mechanical Design= 1/x0, this is the case. Let gx=x log x, x1=1
s
, x2=2
s
.
Then
g1x1 + 2x21gx1 + 2gx2 33
proving 32.
If s0, the inequality must be reversed in 30, but since
11
s+22
s is now non-negative, the sign of the inequality is
recovered in 31.
This proves the proposition. It should be noted that if 1 and 2
are nonzero, and not equal, then strict inequalities hold throughout
the proof.
The proof of Proposition 3 requires a lemma:
Lemma 10. Let
hx,y ;v,w =
vx logx + wy logy − vx + wylogvx + wy
vx + wy
34
If x ,y ,v, w0, then
d
dx
hx,y ;v,w0 if x y
0 if x y  35
Proof of Lemma 10.
d
dx
hx,y ;v,w =
vwy logx/y
vx + wy2
36
Since all other terms are positive, the sign depends on the sign of
logx /y, which is indeed positive for xy and negative for
xy.
It is a consequence of Lemma 10 that if the interval x1 ,x2 is
wholly contained inside the interval y1 ,y2, then hx1 ,x2 ;v ,w
hy1 ,y2 ;v ,w.
Proof of Proposition 3. With a little algebra, d /
dsPs1 ,2 ;1 ,2 /Ps1 ,2 ;1 ,2 is seen to be
Ps1,2;1,2
s2Ps1,2;1,2
Y − Z 37whereY =
11
s log1
s + 22
s log2
s − 11
s + 22
slog11
s + 22
s
11
s + 22
s
38
and
Z =
11
s log1
s + 22
s log2
s − 11
s + 22
slog11
s + 22
s
11
s + 22
s
39Since the first factor in Eq. 37 is positive, the derivative is non-
negative whenever Y	Z. Setting xi=i
s
, yi=i
s
, and 1=v,
2=w, and applying Lemma 10, this is always the case.
The proof of Proposition 4 also requires a lemma.
Lemma 11. If M is an undominated finite set of preference
pairs and 1 ,2M, then there exists 0 such that every
other element of M is dominated by either 1− ,1 or by
1,2−.
Proof of Lemma 11. Consider 1 ,2M. Since 1 ,2
does not dominate 1 ,2, either 11, or 22. If 11,
let = 1−1 /2. Then 1− ,1 dominates 1 ,2. If 22,finite, this can be repeated for all remaining elements of M; let 
be the smallest such , and every element of M except 1 ,2 is
dominated either by 1− ,1, or by 1,2−.
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemma 11, it suffices to show that
for any , the following pair of equations can be solved for s and
:
Ps1,2;1, = Ps1,2 − ;1, 40
Ps1,2;1, = Ps1 − ,2;1, 41
If s=0 is a solution, then the proposition is proved. If s0, then
the following equations must be solved:
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1
s + 2
s
= 1 − s +  42
1
s + 2
s
= 1 + 2 − s 43
Solving 43 for  yields
 =
1 − 1
s
2
s
− 2 − s
44
and plugging this into 42, and rearranging terms as below, gives
the following that must be solved for s:
1 − 1
s1 − 2
s − 1
s
− 1 − s2
s
− 2 − s = 0
45
1 − 1
s
− 2
s
− 1 − s2 − s + 1
s2 − s + 2
s1 − s = 0
46
which can be rewritten as
1 − es log 1 − es log 2 − es log1−2− + es log12−
+ es log21− = 0 47
Now, the first derivative of 47 with respect to s, evaluated at
s=0, is 0; the second derivative is positive at s=0. It thus suffices
to show that the left-hand side of 47 is negative for some s0.
Since 1, 1− 0,1 and 0, we can set A1=log 1. Since
log1− log 10, there is some 10 such that A1−1
=log1−. Similarly, we can define A2 ,2 with A2=log 2 and
A2−2=log2−.
Then consider the limit
lim
s→
1 − esA1 − esA2 − esA1−1+A2−2 + esA1+A2−2 + esA2+A1−1
48
which is the same as
lim
t→
1 − et
A1
 − et
A2
 − et
A1
+
A2
+1+2 + et
A1
+
A2
+2 + et
A1
+
A2
+1
49
Since this expression is dominated as t→ by the term
et
A1
+
A2
+1+2, it must take on negative values for some t0
i.e., for some s0. Therefore, the set of Eqs. 40 has a solution.
Proof of Proposition 5. Equality of overall preference is estab-
lished by finding s and  such that
1s + 2s1 +  
1/s
= 1s + 2s1 +  
1/s
50
Although this is not defined at s=0, it is continuous through that
point, and it suffices to consider
1
s + 2
s
= 1
s + 2
s 51
Solving for  gives
 =
1
s
− 1
s
2
s
− 2
s
52
For s0, 52 has a solution. This solution is positive since
11 and 22. For s=0, the solution, also positive, is
 =
log 1 − log 1
log 2 − log 2
53
which can be found by taking the limit as s→0, or by solving
12

=12
 directly.
Proof of Proposition 6. If 1 ,2, then 1 ,2, 1,2−,
and 1− ,1 are mutually undominated. Consider the case of a
fixed s0. By Proposition 5, there exist  and  such thatPs1,2;1, = Ps1,2 − ;1, 54
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which can be solved for  and  as follows:
 =
1
s
− 1 − s
1 − 2
s
56
 =
1 − 1
s
2
s
− 2 − s
57
We show first that there is an 0 such that =. To do this,
we need to find  such that
1
s
− 1 − s2
s
− 2 − s = 1 − 1
s1 − 2
s 58
Note that the right-hand side of 58 is positive. As →0+, the
left-hand side of 58 goes to zero. As →min1 ,2, the left-
hand side of 58 tends to +. Thus there is an 
 0,min1 ,2 for which =. Let
1,2 = 1,2 − 2 59

1,
2 = 1 − 2,1 60
Then
Ps1,2;1, Ps1,2;1, ∀   61
Ps
1,
2;1, Ps1,2;1, ∀ 	  62
Since =, the proposition is proved for the case where s0.
By Proposition 3, increasing the value of s will favor 1 ,2
over 1 ,2, and will also favor 
1 ,
2 over 1 ,2. This
proves the proposition for all s−.
Note that if s=−, as long as 12, the undominated point
min1,2 + 
1 − 2
2 ,min1,2 + 
1 − 2
2  63
is always preferred over 1 ,2.
Proof of Proposition 7. As in the proof of Proposition 5 it
suffices to consider
1
s + 2
s
= 1
s + 2
s 64
1. If 11, 22, then consider the following two limits:
lim
s→−
1
s
− 1
s
2
s
− 2
s
= 0 65
lim
s→
1
s
− 1
s
2
s
− 2
s
=  66
Thus the range of the right-hand side of 52 is all positive
, and for every  there is a degree of compensation s.
2. If 1221, then
Ps1,2;1,1 Ps1,2;1,1 67
Furthermore, for any  0,1,
Ps1,2;1, Ps1,2;1,1 Ps1,2;1,1
 Ps1,2;1, 68
Thus it is impossible to find a degree of compensation s to
achieve equality for all possible weights .
Furthermore,
lim
1
s
− 1
s
 s −  s
=  69s→− 2 2
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lim
s→
1
s
− 1
s
2
s
− 2
s
=  70and there is a minimal  which is reached when
20 See, T.-K., Gurnani, A., and Lewis, K. 2004, “Multiattribute Decision Making
Journal of Mechanical Designd
ds
1
s
− 1
s
2
s
− 2
s
= 0 71is equal to 0, i.e., when2
s
− 2
s1
slog 1 − 1
slog 1 − 1
s
− 1
s2
slog 2 − 2
slog 2
2
s
− 2
s2
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